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The Body of Christ:
The Claim of the Crucified People
on US. Theology and Ethics
Robert Lassalle-chin
Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley
Graduate
'l'heological Union
How do we talk about (Sod after Auschwitz?
you ask yourselves,
over there, on the other side, of the sea, in plenty
“How do we talk about (iod ingitio Auschwitz?“
ask my friends here,
laden with reason, weeping and blood,
immersed in the daily deaths of millions‘
Mljeclro Casaldéliga
Among so many Sigm which always exist, some calling for attention
and others barely perceptible, them is in every time one which is the
principle one, by whose light the other should be discerned and inter~
preted. This Sign is always the historically crucifiedpeople, which joins
to its permanence the, always distinctive historical form of its crucifi»
lUn.‘
mlgnacio Ellacurid
This essay will address the claim of the historical reality of the cru-
cified people of El Salvador on theology and ethics as it 1:; done in the
United States, in part one I will explain the idea of the crucified people,
grounding the concept in the historical reality of the crucified people
of El Mozote, El Salvador, and interpreting its meaning with reference
to a governing theological concept: the reign of God The entire dis-
cussion will be offered as a soteriological narrative exemplifying a re-
‘l‘edro (Tamirléliga, 'I‘odiwira wins palatmzs (Estella, 1989) 45. Quoted in ion
Sobrino, Mus the l ilmt’utor: A Htlll'lr‘’rThifitlngiilRowing 0/7051”:ofNilznmlh, trains.
Paul Burma and Francis McDonngh (Marylsnoll, NY; Orbis Books, W93) 253‘
2ignario Ellaruria, "Diacemir 'el signo’ de los tiempoa,” Dialronia 17 (Jami:
ary/April, 1981)?)7-"1,
The 80th) of (floral 4L)
markable and profound overarching horizon of Christian historical re»
alism, In part two I will develop an outline of a formal philmophiml
and theological concept of the Christian historical realism that has pro-
cluch this important new concept of the crucified peoples, it will use
the concept of Christian historical realism to interpret the important
claims which the crucified people place on theology and ethics;
Part One:
The l-listorical leity Milli"Crurij‘irvlPeopleand Hit" Riki'inofGoiil
Tm? l’ilSl‘tmitcAl RMii'rr or ‘ii it} Cirur ‘1) Po Mi:
in 1978 lgnacio Ellacuria introd int i a new idea for theology, spir-
ituality and ethics in his esoay “The Crucitiori People: An
"
ay in His-
torical Soteriology.“ He turns to the figure of the suffering servant
from Second lsaiah “on which the primitive Christian community fris-
tenecl in order to understand )esus’ death“ And he argues "this entitles;
us” to use the image to otter a christologiml interpretation not only of
"the death of Iesus," but of the “crucified people,” which he defines as
that “vast portion of humankind, which is literally and actually cruci-
fied by natural, . . . historical, and personal opp‘ “om. ticuria
also reminds us of the disturbing, fact that their ongoing crucifixion has
been a defining aspect of "the, reality of the world in which the church
has existed for almost two thousand years, llitemllyl Since lows an-
nounced the approach of the Reign of God,”
This image of the crucified people now appears in various forms in
theological writings from throughout the Third World John Waliggo,
writing an “African Christology in a Situation of Sutiering,” agks,
"Who is Christ to the suffering people of Africa?“ In his study of
Ugandan seminarians he finds "informants str ssecl the Suffering
Servant who experienced suffering and silently suffers with all his
‘ignacio illliictiria, "The (i’rutitieti People” il/lzrstvriimi lilimirimm {Mary—
knoll, NY; Ortiis Books, 1993) 55!) 604. translated from "1-1! pueblo crucihcarlo, en-
sayo de soteriologia historian,” Cruz y Rcwl is, ed. lgnacio ii‘llticuriii et at,
(Mexico City: Cl‘R, l978) 4932. Alan in Selt’ it» 5 ll Hugh!71» (Willi) 3254i; Kc»
vista Lalimmmeriranu (tr 'l‘eologtiz18 (1989) 30 , razor: de lo iglr'aiiiiii Raina
de Dios (San Salvaclo ' CA Editores, W84 o2, and in the Spanish edition oi
MySti’rz’umlibemtm
' '
'ador: UCA Editoi‘es, i990) 2189 210.
’Ellacuria, "The (‘rucit’ied People,” 592,
‘7 ibid,, 580,
njohn M, Wtiliggo, "Airlmn ('hrisiology m a Situation oi Britten
[(5 in Africa, Utiv Robert Schreitor (Mdryknoll, NY; Orbh Books, 19%, 1995
lh- 80,
”
lhicli, 164,
Sll [\‘olwrl Lizsmlli‘» Klein
children,”é This leads him to crit‘
‘
,- "classic christology," which
“tends to Shy from relating, to Christ’s death the diiily deaths of men
and women,” for failing “to draw out practical and concrete ways in
which Chri, am son live and hear witneos to this Christology’” An~
other African, Kwesi A. Dickson, criticizes W «item theology for treat-
ing death as “an emharmsmient to be p ed over as quickly a
possible." He is working to develop an African theology of the cm.
Writing lrom Seoul, Korea, Chung liyun Kyuni,r asserts that “the
most prevailing image of Jesus among Asian women/s theological ex-
pressions is the image ol the suffering servant," asserting that “they
are making meaning out of their suffering through the stories of Jesus’
life and death." She adds a critical note, asserting that Asian women
are well aware, that
"making meaning out of suffering is a dangeroub
businvss‘ , i . {which} can be both a seed [or lihorarion and an opium
for. i ,opprossion."“
Kosuke Koyama, originally from japan and ii leading figure in
Asian Christian theology, draws attention to the fact that "the domi-
nant reality of Anian suffering is that people are wanted: wasted by
hunger, torture, deprivation of rightg; wasted by economic exploita»
lion, racial and ethnic discrimination, eexual suppression wasted by
loneliness, nonrelation, noncommunity.”l2 He quotes the blxth Assam“
hly of the Christian Conference of Asia (June 1977): “hi this situation
we begin by stating that people are not to be wasted, people are valu-
able, made in God’s iinago” And he, argues, “li a person is starved, the
living image of (Sod is wasted. . . . The empty stomach means an
insult to the image oi God.”H
Finally, describing "Imus Christ in Popular I’iety in the Philip.
pines/“l Salvador T, Martinez a. , “To a nation, 70 percent of whose
people live in absolute poverty, conotcmtly mcndced by hunger and
disease, hy ignorance and tea», dcprived of education and other basic
rights, where the, gap between the poor and the, rich is ever widening,
who do we my (,‘lirisl is?""‘ His answer i5 to describe how Filipinos
:r
“lbid,, '176,
“ lbid., 168.
“‘Kwoi A, lilirkson, fllimlovyi;in Afrim {Mari/knoll, NY; ()rbis Bot
lm‘lb'. ( \iled in Robert Schreitcr, "lnlri‘iduction,’ ‘ 5 (#1851 in Africa, 7'-
“ (hung Hyun Kyung, “Who l. u; for A, an Women?” Asian l'acc,» oflesiis,
ccl. R. S Sugirtharajah (Mar), knoll, N lrbL Sooks, 1993, WW5) 22-1,
‘3 hosoke Koymim, “The Cruci Christ Challenng Human Power,” Asian
,
156,
.,
'157,
lvador T, Martinez, “lesus Christ in Popular l’ioty in the Philippines,”
of laws, 7.477 57A
‘ ll)ld., 250.
a 1984?
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have reappropriated and incultumted traditional images from the cul-
tural world of their Christian colonizcrb‘ in order to draw active analo—
gies between their own situation of oppression and that of Jesus:
lii Latin America, Jon Sobrino/s recent work is thoroughly shaped
by what he calls the amilogalum primers between the deaths of Jo
and the "crucied people"m His most recent christology, “written in
the midst of crucifixion, but definitely in the hope of liberation," arr
gues that “liberation and crucifixion provide the, basic tension for
Christian faith and aleo the basic objective, tension in chi" tology on
this continent,”{7 But he asserts that it is the power of the historical re-
ality itself, which has turned the attention of Latin American liberation
theology toward the crucified people.
in Latin America , , , both Christ and the continent are today crucified.
And their crosi 5 . . . force one to think. The relatively pacific “who do
you say that I am?" becom % a pressing question in the mouth of the cm
cified Christ and of the crucified people. . . . "Suffcring precede, k:
mg,” gaid Feuerhach, but the suffering ot the ct also hit ‘hly produces
thinking, if the Situation of cm 1d poop and of (fhrit in them»
does not force us. to think, one can ask what will, or what other thinking
can be more necessary and urgent than this?”
We turn for a moment, then, to gaze on the historical reality of a specific
event of the crucifixion of the Salvadoran people. We fich to locate our
place in the drama at the foot of their cross,
The Historical lez’ti/ ofllze Crucificd Peopleof £7!Mozolr’
and Our Place at the Foot of Their Cross
The events which occurred in the village of iil Mozotc, Morazan,
on December 10 and ll, 1981, and the weeks following, form a hoartv
breaking microcosm of the historical reality of El Solvaclor’s crucified
people and our place iii the foot of their croo, On March l5, 1993, the
United Nations Commission on the Truth for El Salvador issued its
report From Madness to Hope: The Twelwli 4' War in 15! Salvador, ’l‘he
report summarizes the brutal facts of the case:
On December ltl, 1981, in the village of El Mozo , , . Mornmn, [El il-
vador] . . , the Atlacatl Battalion detained, Without r 'is‘tani‘e, all the
men, women and children who were in the place, The following clay,
“Sobrino, [ex
lhlbidv l.
"' lbid., 3
s the Liberator, 270 l,
52 (<01er 1ussnliv» Kim:
l)ecomher ll, , . , they were deliberately and sygtemdlically executed
, , over 200 The gure it; higher , . i [with] unidentified victims,W
The repori provides heartbreaking detail of soldiers” savagery:
During the morning, they [the troops! proceeded to interrogate torture
and execute the men in various locations, Around noon, they began talk-
ing; out the women in groupe, separating them from their children and
machinegunning them. Finally they killed the Children. A group of
children who had been locked in the convent were machine-gunned
through the windowa After extormiimtiiig the entire population, the sol-
diers set fire to the building
The Commissioners add that the massacre was planned with other
military unite as part of “Operation Resal!e,""“ which proceeded for a
period of days to carry out similar slaughters of women and children
in the surrounding villages of [Va Joya, La Rancheria, hos 'l‘oriles, Jocote
Amarillo, and Cerro l’ando. They note the Armed Forces High Com-
mand of Salvador then “repeatedly denied the massacre occurre
”
while its own chief of stall, who “was; aware that the massacre had 00
curred, , . . failed to undertake any irivecitiy;alion.“72
The widely reapecied UN. Truth Commi Qion report then explic-
itly links these {11:15th as to US, counterinsurgency policy, it explains,
that the Atlacatl Bait lion was a Rapid Deployment infantry Battalion
(BIRI) “specially trained for ’counter—i surgency' warfare, It was the
first unit of its kind in the armed forces and had [just] completed its
training, under the supervision of United States military advisers, at
the beginning of that year, 1981?“ The report explicitly contradicts
any impression that Mozote might have been an aberration of mili‘
tary policy restricted to the early 19805, noting that, almost a decade
later in 1989, members; of the very same battalion carried out the mur-
tiers of six jesuitb‘ and two women at the University of Central Amer~
lCéL
A 1991 report prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Pentagon24
is even more ingistent on these points,
tilted Nations (i'omm' ‘ "
r ‘l'rwlw-Ymr War it
"’lhid, HS.
" lhiri.
id., l2l.
vitl
,
lib.
3* Benjamin (: L‘ ‘hwm’z, American Conmyrmsugmcy Doctrine and El Salvador:
The Frustrations of Rrgy’om:am! My lllmiom of Nation Building (Santa Monica, Calif;
RAND, 1991).
m on the Truth for lil Salvador, From Madness to
lzmdor (March 15, 1993) 114‘
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The very battalion whobe members murdered the lesulix [oi the Univer-
aity of Central American in liltW] had been treated, trained, and
equipped by the United States; it was, indeed, the first Salvadoran bat-
talion designed to serve as; a model of A than ottlcient weapon in the
tight against the l‘MiN.” The Atlamtl Battalion has had a partlrularly
ferocious history, mag wring, {over 200] peasante in ill Mo/ote in Will,
killing dozens of villagers from 'l'emiucingo and Copapayo in ’l983, and
slaughtering 68 in the hamlet of ins llanitos and 50 at the (,itialsinga
River in 1984?“
The Pentagon report, however, reaches; further in situating the activities
of the Atlacatl Battalion within the larger horizon of US. counterin‘
surgericy policy, The writer explains that the Reagan Administration
had decided the Salvadoran Civil war provided an “ideal testing
ground”7 for testing the etiectiveneg‘ of pthiemam "lowclntensity
conflict doctrine,“* But the seriou, and intentionality ot the US,
government’s involvement in this lgbll counterinsurgency "experi
ment” went far beyond the status of a mere administration policy. "this
is best captured by El Salvador '5 decade of dominance among, tor-
eign aid commitments between 1981 and lWl, The 1991 Pentagon re‘
port states:
The conict there ha» been the moat cxpent
'
Amorimn eltort to have
an all from rm insur renc ' since Vietnam. , Salvador has ubtyorlved atY b )
“FMLN is an acronym for the Fambuurlo Marti From for Nationul Liberation,
it was officially turmed on October it}, 1980, when aeveml ot the mom important
politicdlvmililary organizations working to overthrow the government of ill Stil—
Vador united under its banner, in 1970 the firm of what would bect‘lme the live
politl “ military organizatiom constituting the FMLN was founded when 9' [-
yzidor Cayetano Cm’pio resigned from the Cominun Party of ill Salvador (l‘CS),
went underground, and founded the Popular For of l. oration (H’Ll In 1972
the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERT’) ' ' emerged from the Cormmmi-at
Party with a different, younger, and more dive, r comtitueucy. in 1975 the Armed
Forces of the National Resiutance (FARM) was formed by a group which left the
ERP when a hard line faction assassinated Roun Dalton, lgl Salvridor’s mom im-
portant living poet (then a member of the [5 l’), ostensibly because of l
on the need to emphasize politieal as well a5 military revolutionary trcti ,
following year, on january 26, 1976, the Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers (PRTC) was founded during a emigre of union workers, indivir: _
left the group which founded the ERP in {72, and others. Finally, in 1979,
{self formed the Armed Forces of Liberation (FA Ll
"t Schwarl, Americh (‘mmtmnymgency, 7t .
2"l w“ 'l‘ambts an "rank Aker, “Shattering the V'
nario for Succesa in Fl ‘alvador," unpublished mam pt, ll, (' ted in Michael
Klare and Peter Kornhiuh, eds, Low [Him-airy War/ll , , minim irgmry, l’mimur-
guilty and Antiturmrism in (hr Eighties ( few York: handout l’luuse, W88) ill,
BKSthwarz, American Cr>untvrmsuqycnry,l.
‘tnam ‘ivndrome: A Ste
54 Robert LassnlloKle’m
lea $15 billion, over $1 billion of which l“; in military and When com-
bined with over $850 million in unsubsidized credits and an entimateti
CIA investment of over {55th million, the total expenditum approaches
$6 billion. Only five countries l't‘t‘k’th‘ more American aid each year than
li ilvudor, a nation of 5,3 million people,”
This background, then, allows m to locate ourselves at the foot of
the em “ of the crucified children of [Ll Mozote. In 1993 the UN, Truth
Comm axon would report that in the convent "M3 bodies were iden»
titled, including 13} children under the age of 12 [whose] . r .average
age . . . was , , . six” The, report documents that they had all been
murdered with “United States-manufactured M-16 rifles” firing am-
munition "manufactured for the United States Government at Lake
City, Missouri?” if nothing else, these facts should leave US. citizens
wondering about the claim of the historical reality of the crucified
people, of El Salvador on theology and ethics as it is done in this coun-
try,
[on Sabrina on the: llinmriml Reality if [ha Crucind Pauplv
and the Kingdom of God
‘l‘nia CRUCIl-‘IHJ [moi-Hr: A l-loieRiier; FACT
In "The Crucified People: Yahweh’s Suffering Servant Today,” a
1992 es ay written for the five hundred year anniversary of the arrival
of the Spanish in the Americas, Ion Sohrino claims a most appropriate
“startii 3 point for talking about the crucified peoples” (given the oc-
casion), lo asserts that when the historical reality of “the crucified
people shows us what we are, we tend to ignore it, cover it up, or
distort it, because it simply terrifies Lier Playing on the metaphor of
the discovery of the Americas, he, then proposes to "start by dis-covering
the covercd‘up reality of our world?
He finds lgnacio Ellucurid’s provocative phrase that “creation has
turned out badly for Cow“ i‘ont’irmed by “horrifying” economic data:
{mm 1971 to 1990 the number of Latin Americans living in poverty in-
}“ion Roport, H7 (+3354), “8 (#357), H") (#366).
“'l he (Trucltied Peoples: Yahweh's Suffering, Servant ’loday,"
The Principle QfMarcy: ’ king the Crimir’dPmplefmm thy Cris: (Mari/knoll, NY;
Urhia Books. 1994 ,l 5 lated from El l‘riuripio Mi» mlia: Bruin (it In mix
a (as pueblo» arm say appears
in a revised and e.
“Sobriuo, “('rucitieil Peoples,” 40,
“ lbid,
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creased from 7i to 183 millioni“ Since “tho poor are those who die
before their time, as Gustavo (Jutiorrez repeatedly sayg,’ ~ ” Sobrino reA
minds us that these statistics represent the suffering of hundredra of
millions of men, women, and children. So too both john Paul ll (8olluiir
twin mi socialis, 1987) and Latin American bishops confirm the reality
of "the situation of inhuman poverty in which millions of Latin Ameri-
cans live” (Puebla, no, 29, 1979),
Describing this reality as a “historical disaster,” Solu'ino («smarts
that
At the origin of What we call Latin America today thou" lit-5’ an original
and originating sin. To give one single fact: Some seventy years alter
'l492, the indigenous population had been reduced to 15 patient; many
of their Cultures had been destroyed and suhleoted to anthropological
death This was a colossal LllSDSll?!‘ . .
.,
a historical tit slur, and we have
to give it a name. Our Current language Gallo the, e pooplee "Third
World,” “the South," “developing Countries,” These dooignation are dl‘
tempting to say thal something is wrong, but ranch language doea not
communicute how wrong, Therofore We need to speak of Cruttihed
peoples; metaphorical language, of course, but language which convoys
much better than (llllt’l’ tho historical ei'tormtty of the disater and his
meaning tor faith."
THE Ckucnrngo Prowl; Mnervio l'tllt int: RilioN or (too
Priority of the Reign
Sobrino suggests that "to call the peoples of the Third World ‘t‘ru'
ciecl people,“ ‘Yahweh’s suffering servant,“ [nrl “the prewncc of the
crucified Christ in history,’ is the mth important theological statement
we can make about them,"” Accordingly, it
‘
Submitted to the "fun-
damental methodological” choice which Lllmlplll‘lt‘se 'ery other State—
ment in Latin American christology: “to go back to lesus in onlvr to
rethink all theological realities in terms of him.My And, for Sobrino, this
will mean that the image of the “crucified peoples" must b J Qit'uated
within what was “the final reality for lows: the Kingdom oi
Sobrino presents several reasons why the reign oi God tunctiom‘» its
a theological ultimate for l min American liberation theology. First, he
"‘Sobrino, [2510;the Lilmator, 278, n. 30 Also taco Si‘ibrino, "Crtu‘itieti l’eoploa,” Jl‘l.
>"Sobrino, [a * lie Lilmrrilur, 251i.
“Sobrino, "C ucitied Peoples,” Sit.
"’Sobrino, ,é’taiistlu? Liberator, 2M,
Whirl, 266,
“See bohrino, “lemursand the Kingdom oi Coil,” Imus 1hr (,i/vmmr, «7-» M4, mp.
67-70.
5t» Ix’oticirl Lizard/10 Klein
argues that "the Third World . . r presents an historical reality some-
how oi'ialogous to that in which the very notion ot a ’Kingdom of God’
arose/’4" Second, lib Aration theology’s formal commitment to histori-
cal, prophetic, praxic, and popular values "can be formulated generi-
cally as [a comrriitment to] the Kingdom’s transcendence in history.”’“
Accordingly, “Liberation theology . . . claims to have found in the
Kingdom of God a totality from which it can deal with all theological
subjects and also rank them in accordance with their closeness to the
ultimate mystery, now formulated as [the] Kingdom of God/"'2 Third,
this helps liberation theology practically to overcome the danger of
“equating the Kingdom with the church," and it Clariti s the "historh
cal malice of the, world" for the m wage of Jesus. Fourth, it makes
SCRSC christologically since it “retri ves the historical Jesus and i _ .
makes central the Kingdom that Jesus preached, while applying it to
the historical present/“l
Sobrino believes this methodological commitment, together with
the historical reality ot the crucified people, places several claims on
Christian theology and ethics (especially those clone from a liberation
perspective) "tor the obvious reason that the Kingdom did not come in
Jesus’ time, and the present requires that we set it in history“M First,
our place at the loot of the cross of sultering peoples generates the
"basic task to establish, methodologically and systematically i , , the
reality of the antiningdomi” ’l'his is nec dry so that the "salvation
brought by the Kingdom r . . will, then, be ng saved in history from
the evils of history.” Second, liberation theology must take "absolutely
seriously the question of who the Kingdom is for and reaffirm that it
belongs to the poor,""‘ l'Iowever, Sobrino also addresses the question
of how the kingdom is "for" the non-poor as well, in the kingdom, the
nonrpoor are, evangelized by the poor, most especially when the now
poor assume, a role, of "real kenosis, of real service to and support of
the materially poor, of sharing in and taking on the fate of the poor/"t
Third, the historical reality of the. crucified people "obliges us to make
[the kingdom] present through historical mediations and to bring it
about at all levels of historical reality,” despite the tact that it “cannot
ever be hilly realized in history” And fourth, theology proclaims that
only when "humankind becomes a single people and a true people in
“livid, 122,
‘3 l,
*2 livid, 28‘), n. 31.
“lliid
,
l23,
“think, 125,
““lbidt, lZo,
klbii’l., llti.
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which relationships of justice and solidarity reign, then the Kingdom
of God will have come,”47
Martyrst the Kingdom
This methodological approach, and the substantive claims placed
on theology and ethics by the crucified peoples, then leads Sobrino to
search for an analogatmn prinpr between the innocent death of the
“crucified people” and the martyrdom of lesus He turns first to the
dissatisfaction expressed in one of Karl Rahner/s last writings with the
applicability of the usual understanding of martyrdom in dogmatics
and fundamental theology (the "tree and patient acceptance of death
for the cause of the faith [including its moral teaching] in its totality, or
with respect to a particular doctrine but with the totality of the faith
always in view”)*‘3to the situation of various Latin American martyrs.
Rahner asks, “Why should not someone like Bishop Romero, who died
while fighting for justice in s *iety, a struggle he waged out of the
depths of his concern as a Christian, why should he not be a martyr?“
This question bolsters Sobrino's claim that the role ot questions of jus‘
tice in the deaths of so many Latin American martyrs "have obliged
theology to rethink its methodological approach to Christian martyr.
dom . . i through the death of Jesus”R0
Consistent with the methodological principle enunciated above,
Sobrino then follows the work of Leonardo Boff, who "begins his
analysis of martyrdom starting from Jesus Christ the basic sacrament
of martyrdom? He argues that martyrs should be considered as “mar-
tyrs of the kingdom of God" and that we should be able to interpret
the meaning of their work in terms of its contribution to building the
kingdom or defeating the anti~kingdom. The logic of this approach is
grounded in a fundamental assertion of Sobrino christology:
Jesus did not preach himself and did not come to bear witness to him-
self. He preached God’s Kingdom and the God of the Kingdom, and
bore witness to it with his life. 50 Jesus is also a witness and martyr for
the Kingdom of God. And theretore, theologically those who today bear
Witness with their lives to God’s kingdom, like Jesus, are martyrs, and in
them we find the arialogatum gtrirza'psof martyrdom.“
"lbidt, l31.
“Josef Hoter and Karl Rahner, Luxikrm fur ’I‘lzirologiamid Malta, (2d ed
(Preiburg: Herder, 1957—1967) 7:136. Cited in Sobrino, Jesus Hw Liberator, 265.
“Karl Rainier, "lnieiisiom ot Martyrdom: A Plea tor the roadening of the
Classical Concept,” szcilium 163(1983) it). Cited in Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, 265:.
“‘8 brino, Jesus the Liberator, 266,
5‘ [bid., 268.
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Sobrino then identifies three typical situations" in which the “cruci~
tied people" might legitimately be understood as the “martyred people."
‘l‘here are those prietsts, nuns, catech' ', delegates of the words, students,
trade unionism, peasants, workers, teachers, journalists, doctors, lawyers,
etc, who structurally reproduce the martyrdom of Jesus: "They defended
the Kingdom and attacked the anti-Kingdom” with a prophetic voice
"and were put to death,“2 There are those who die an ethical “soldier’s
death," defending the kingdom by open struggle using “some sorl of
violence,” l he suggests that it is possible for them to “reproduce a central
element of martyrdom: laying down one’s life [or love" So that they too
could be considered to “share in martyrdom by analogyw
Then
finally, there are the muscles who are innocently and anonymously mur~
dercd, even though they have not used any explicit form of violence,
even verbal, They Clo not actively lay down their lives to defend the
faith, or even, directly, to defend God’s Kingdom. They are the peasants,
children, Women and old people, above all who died Slowly day after
day, and die violently with incredible cruelty and totally unprotected.“
These words describe many who died innocently at El Mozote in l98l,
Sobrino suggests that "in order to be able to call them martyrs . i ,we
must give deep thought to what is martyrdom’s analogatlmi princcps,
and think about it looking at the cross of Jesusi"
What Sobrino finds there is not so much “the active character of
the struggle against the anti— ingdom," or a free choice to undertake
such a struggle, Rather, he nds “In comparison with Jesus’ death, the
deaths of these murdered masses i . . illustrate i . , historical inno-
cence—because they have done nothing to deserve death except to be
poor- hurl vulnerability«—-~becau5e they are not even physically ca-
pable of avoiding it.” This aspect of their suffering transforms it into a
call to conversion and repentance, "for their deaths make clear that it
is these masses who are unjustly burdened with a sin which has been
annihilating them i . , These masses, who are oppressed during their
lives and die in massacres, are the ones who illustrate best the vast suf‘
fering of the world.”55 This leads Sobrino to the conclusion that, "if we
consider martyrdom in terms of the anthKitigdom’S response to those
who struggle actively for the Kingdom, the mmlogatum prinreps of the
martyr is that exemplified by Archbishop Romero.” lilowever, “if we
‘3 lbid., 26"),
“~‘ lbid, 270,
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consider it in terms of really bearing the ein of the anti-Kingdom, the
rmalogatum princcps becomes the unprotected mas 3, who are put to
death in huge numbers innocenin and anonymously" lie concludes
with the deeply christological assertion that “they are the ones who
most abundantly and cruelly ’fill up in their esh' what is lacking in
Christ’s passion, They are the Suffering Servant and they are the crul
cified C hrist t0day.”5"
THE CRUCIFIED PEOPLE: BEARERS or SAivpgnow
What exactly is the salvation that the crucied people bring? So-
brino warns his reader that acceptng that God chooses: the crucified
people “and makes them the principal means of Salvation” will turn
out to be “as scandalous as accepting God's choice of the Servant and
the crucified Christ to bring salvation/"w He then concretizes this by
suggesting four ways in which the crucified peoples bring salvation.
First, they are killed for the salvific act of establishing right and jus—
tice, which they do simply by having made a place, {or their families
and communities in a world which is actively hostile to their very
existence?" By having struggled to live under difficult circumstances,
they have made it possible (or their children, siblings, or parents to
continue to struggle for life. Second, the biblical revelation that they
have been chosen by God "as bringers of salvation” traneforms the
scandal of their suffering; into a powerful religious force {or the very
necessary “struggle for justice and liberation?“ 'l‘hircl, their suffering
reveals that the affirmation that “Jesus ‘died for our sins,” a funda—
mental stutement in the New Testament, means really “to be crushed
on a particular historical occasion—~by sinners,” And it shows that
“what should be done about sin, another fundamental question in the
New Testament A . , is clear; eradicate it . . . by hearing it”
Fourth, the crucified people are a "light to the nations."“" Here So-
brino makes the powerful argument that “the mere existence of the
crucified people is what can-~antl in the last retaort the only thing that
“lbid, 271.
"'lbidv 259
’* lbicli, 260,
W lbid,, 258, Sobrino links this trait to “prophetsz, prieth and bishopss,nuns and
catechii
., peasants and workers, Studi‘ni and leclur . . trylingl to establish
right and justice,” and leaves out the poor who die "p 'ely” l'lowever, l am as-
serting that Simply by supporting their families and neighbors who are persecuted,
they are playing perhaps the most important poysible role in the work to establish
righteousness and justice
“l lbid., 260.
“3 lbid., 26L
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can~unmask the lie by which this world’s reality is concealed. Im—
prisonng truth with injustice, is the fundamental sin of human beings
and also of nations." For US, practitioners of theology and ethics still
contemplating the crucified people of El Mozote, Sobrino’s interpreta-
tion (following Ellacuria) of what is positively revealed to us will be
particularly disturbing. These innocent children, crucified with bullets
“manufactured for the United States Government at lake City, Mis'
souri/"’2 reveal that
the United St; is much worse oft than Latin America, Because the
United States ha a solution, but . , . it is a bad solution, both for it and
for the world in general, On the other hand, in Latin America there are
no solutions, only problems. But, however painful this may be, it is bet—
ter to have problems than to have a had solution for the future of his'
torv.“
Sobrino then suggests (again following Ellaicuria) that the poor
offer a substantive solution by embodying the possibilities of a “civi«
lization of poverty” as opposed to the current "civilization of capital,
in all its capitalist and socialist fonns.”"‘ This utopian idea is defined in
terms of “all sharing austerely in the earth’s resources so that they can
stretch to everybody.” lie notes that this kind of "sharing achieves
what the First World does not offer: fellowship and, with it, meaning
of life.”
Finally, the crucified people live out "values that are not offered
elsewhere.“S Though it might be argued that "they generate these val-
ues because they have nothing else to hang on to,” their salvitic imr
portunce should not be, trivialized or discounted. Their lives offer
"community against individualism, Cit-operation against selfishness,
simplicity against opulence, and openness to transcendence against
blatant positivism, so prevalent in the civilization of the western
world."‘*‘ The crucified people offer a stubborn hope in the possibilities
of history, and continue to be able to manifest love in the face of a
"structurally selfish world."°" in truth, the survivors of El Mozote, like
so many of the poor, have shown a willingness "to forgive their op-
pressors" and “open their arms and accept” those who come to share
“’ UN. Commission Report, 117 (#354), lit; (#357), 119 (#366),
mIgnacio Ellacuria, “Quinto Contcnario. América Latina, descubrimiento o
encubrimiento?" Riavi‘sta [minorwnwicmiii d6 lbolugiii21 (1990) 278. Cited in Sobrino,
Jesus the Liberator, 26L
M Sobrino, 195145the Liberator, 262; Sobrino, “Crucilit‘d Peoples,” 54,
“Siblings, [es s the Liberator, 263.
“’ Sohrino, "C'rucificd Peoples,” 55,
’" lhid., 56.
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what they have with them. Their suffering has generated real solidar—
ity, which serves as “a model of how people and churches can relate to
one another in a human and Christian way.” Amazingly, the continued
belief of the crucified people in the compassion of God and the values
of the kingdom “offer faith, a way of being church, and a more genu~
inc, Christian, and relevant holiness for the world today.”
In the end, Sobrino says that while “it is necessary for us to speak
of A , . crucied peoples,“ in truth "the solo objzit'tofall this talk must be to
bring them down from the cm '. "’l Pressing the point, he reminds us that
"coming to terms with" the historical reality of God’s presence with the
crucied people, “has to be accompanied by ‘carrying’ the cross and
taking responsibility for the crucified/"W What i believe this means for
us is that the crucified children of El Mozote place a claim on US. the—
ology and ethics as it is done at the foot of their cross. It means that,
at the hour to truth, unless we profoundly accept the truth of the cruci'
tied peoples and the fundamental responsibility of successive empires
for their crucifixion, we will miss the main tact. That is, that in this world
there is still enormous sinl Sin is what killed the servant-v—the Son of
God—and sin is what continues to kill God’s children. And this sin is in.
icted by some upon others?“
Citing the words of Ignacio Ellacuria, Sobrino suggests that when
"confronted with the crucified people . , , other worlds can know
their own truth from what they produce, as in an inverted mirror."7'
For Sobrino, the crucified people serve as the preeminent Sign of our
times to
"verify . . . historically"72both the terrifying grip of the reign
of sin on our world and the salvation offered through God’s invitation
to solidarity with the crucified peoples, if we are willing to learn any-
thing from the crucifixion of our brothers and sisters at El Mozote, we
should know that US. theology and ethics have not cceeded in uo‘
tangling our active collaboration with the kingdoms of sin, from the
saving compassion of the reign of God mediated to us through the cru-
cified people of our world,
Part Two:
Christian Historical Realism and the Crut‘ificdPeople
Part one of this essay interpreted the Concept of the crucified
people by locating it within the larger theological concept of the king-
” Ibid, 49.
wSobrino, [ears the Liberator, 252.
“Sobrlno, "Crucified Peoples," 5'3.
7‘Sobrino, jesus the Liberator, 261.
“Sobrino, "Crucilied Peoples,” 53
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dom of God, and historicized it through the heartbreaking story of the
crucified people of El Mozote, El Salvador. The following section will
outline A formal philosophical and theological concept of the Christian
historical realism that produced this important new concept of the cru-
’
‘d people. it will argue that lgnacio Ellacuria's key concept of “his.
tori ization" (which also shapes the work of Ion Sobrino) is quite
parallel to the pragmatic maxim of Ci 8. Peirce And it will use this
structure to substantiate the important claims being placed on cruci-
tied people on US. theology and ethics.
Eu AcueiA’S CH sriAN HISIORICAL REALISM
AND ‘i’nit CoNcism‘ or l”ltS'l‘ORKll'/:AHON
Christian l’lislorical Realism
and Latin American TheologicalMethod
Our discussion so far of the crucified people and the kingdom of
God has been suffused with what I would call a profound Christian
historical realism, embodied in the regular appeal to the idea of his-
tt, " rality, The unique form of this realism is no accident, and it
deserves our attention, We again pay the tax {or the crucifixion of the
children and adults of ill Mozote (as we did in 198D when we do not
take seriously the clrii ms of those whom they have adopted as their
spokespersons, presuming they are not informed by sophisticated the
ory, or experiential referents which call for our attention. In this section
we will look briefly at Ignacio Ellacuria’s formal (and deeply Chris-
tian) philosophy of historical reality. Ellacuria is considered by many
to have developed the most important account of the crucial (and
ubiquitous) Latin American notion of historical reality, so central to the
theology oi liberation, and the power of the concept of the crucified
people,
in 1975 Ellacuria wrote one oi his most important articles, appro-
priately entitled "Toward a Philosophical Foundation for Latin Amerie
can Theological Method?” He argues that liberation theology’s
inherent historical realism distinguishes it philosophically from much
of European theology. He begins summarizing tour principles which
the eminent Emerich Coreth develops from the philosophical her-
meneutics of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Humbolt. Ellacuria suggests
these foundations were currently held by many EuropeanJNorth
American theologians as well: understanding has a circular structure
which compromises the strength of its claims; understanding is basi-
cally the comprehension and description of the structures of human
(r .9. 3
" lgnacio lillacuria "liaciu una tuiidmnontacion clel método teologico Latino~
oniericano," Estiulios tmtmummmnus 301322—13 (August/September, 1975) 40945.
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meaning; the “world” and the things which we take for granted as our
“horizon” are human structures created for the communication and
maintenance of meaning; and all knowledge, including theological
knowledge, is basically a search for meaning." Surprisingly, however,
Ellacuria treats these as philosophical presuppositions which “must be
overcome" in order to "do justice . . . to the reality of human knowing
and . , , Latin American theological thought.” This approach, and the
alternative presuppositions he develops, serve as a short introduction
to Ellac‘uria’s understanding of historical realism and the unique imc
portance he places on a philosophy of historical reality for grounding
the claims of Latin American liberation theology.
Ellacuria proposes "three alternative fundamental principles for
. . [the] conceptualization of human understanding" as it operates in
"Latin-American theological method/’7’" First, "human intelligence is
not only essentially and permanently sensible, but it is there from the
beginning and fundamentally a biological activity/’7" He quotes
Zubiri’s illustrative dictum that "a species of idiots is not biologically
viable.” And he argues that intelligence never loses its character as an
adaptive function, even in its most abstract or feeling-centered expres-
sions,” Second, he emphasizes that “the formal structure of intelli—
gence . . . is not the understanding; of being or the grasp meaning, but
. . apprehending reality and confronting oneself with that reality/’7"
tlere, Ellacuria rst develops the dictum that “confronting oneself
with real things as real" involves three steps: first, getting to know are
ality; second, taking responsibility for doing something about that re-
ality; third, actually transforming reality.”
“lbid” 418.
"Raid, 418—21.
*lbidu 418.
tibial, 419.
“We should notice in this formulation a break with Kant’s tendency to di-
chotomize the operations of "sensibility" and “understanding,” and a profound re-
jection of the basi for Kantian nomindlism in faculty psychology. A decade later
Ellacuria would finish the bulk of a philosophical opus (hilt) pages in length) de-
scribing the structural unity of sensing and understanding in human knowing and
its role in creating and understanding historical reality: Filosoa tie, [ll realidad
llisniri (San Salvador: UCA liditores, 1990).
7“llllacuria, "Hacia una hmdamentacion," 419 O.
h’lbid. The Spanish reads: “cl timers? cargo dé’ In z'eulidad,” "ail rumour mu la mili—
durl,
”
and "cl crxcmgvsc de la realidad.
”
A more literal translation might read: getting
acquainted with reality; carrying the burden of reality; and taking charge oi, or
transforming reality The Word play of the original Spam cannot really be trans-
lated literally My own translation parallels the characterization of the three both of
Ellacuria and of Jon Sobrino in terms of the noetic, ethical, and priorical dimensions
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Students of philosophy will r'ecc’ignizein this a direct attack on the
Husserlian Uplihewhich sought to bracket the question of reality (i.e.,
whether the objects of consciousness actually exist) from philosophy,m
while focusing on the “phenomenological” description of the human
mind at work. In fact, it is Ellacuria’s thesis that it is precisely the, sub-
ordination of the question of the real to that of meaning, or at least to
the archaeological description of human consciousness creating mean-
ing for itself (which informs Heidegger’a work as well), which makes
a fool of philosophy and theology in much of the First World today, He
argues that, no matter what intellectuals may think,
Precisely because of the priority which reality has over meaning, there is
no real change of meaning, without a real change in reality; to try to
change the first without trying to change the second“ is to mislead the
intelligence and its primary function, , , , To believe that by changing
the interpretations of things that the things themselves change, or, at
least, the profound consciousness of one’s location in the world [would
changel, is a grave epistemological error and a profound ethical failure.
Interpretive changes of meaning, and even purely objective analyses of
social and historical realities, are not real changes. And neither are they
even real changes of meaning itself, but usually changes in its formula-
tions. However, this does not keep the intelligence from having an irre~
placeable function, as a theoretical force, for the needed change in the
technical and ethical orders of historical reality.”
This leads, than, to his third and final point: “Human intelligence
is not only always historit al, but this historicity belongs to the essenv
tial structure of intelligence/"l
The full impact of this claim for Ellacuria’s historical realism is im'
possible to grasp without relating it to Zubiri’s debate with the Elm»
pean struggle to choose between the Aristotelian turn to nature (or
various subsequent forms of naturalism), and the post~Kantian turn to
the subject,“ Zubiri rejects both options with the claim that “neither
oi intelligence, See Ion Sobrino, “lgnacio llllacuria, el hombre y el cristiano," un»
published manuscript provided by author, March 1994, 13,
m In this connection Quentin lluuor argues that “this 'epochc’ is clearly _ . , de-
rived from the Cartesian doubt, but Husserl is insistent in pointing out that it is
essentially different 0 doubt reality, be it only methodically, is to take.- a position
with regard to reality, and this l'iusserl will not do; reality Simply does not enter
into the question of 'what’ thi s are” (Plumomunolngy:Its Gmesis and Prospect [New
York: Harper 'l'orchbooks, l958, l965] 49),
uid, 420,
“lbid.
“It is Antonio Gonzach who suggests this explanation in "Aproximacion a
la ohra lilosélica do Ignacio Ellacuria,” Esludms Centnumwriczmos 45 (November /
December 1990) 505%.
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the intrinsic priority of knowing over reality, nor oi reality over know-
ing, is possible Knowing and reality are strictly and rigorously ol the
same genus in their root?“ Antonio Gonzalez, notes that, according), to
Ellacuri’a, this assertion “means that om has gone beyond both the
horizons of Hellenistic naturalism, and modern suliiectiyism . l , lto]
a new horizon/W
What exactly is this new horizon which l‘illacuria believes places
Latin American theology outside the ambit of European philosophy?
In his Dynamic Structum of Reality,” first offered as a course and then
published posthumously in 1989, Ellacuria’s philosophical mentor,
Xavier Zubiri, provides an answer, Zubiri analyzes matter, biological
life, the human person, society, and the dynamic structure of history as
subsystems of a more comprehensive reality (the, c smos). He argues
that, like all the subsystems of reality, history is reciprocally interactive
with the others, But it is also inclusive of the othe is the simmmm of
reality We can see the implications of this approach in the difference
between Heidegger’s definition of humanity as a "rational animal”
(emphasizing the gap that separates human rationality from animal
nature) and Zubiri’s description of humanity as the "animal of reali-
ties"5b (emphasizing the strict historical unity of intelligence and real—
ityt This follows from Zubiri’s metaph al approach to historical
reality, in which human rationality simultaneously depends upon, in-
tegrates, and adds something new to animal nature. And it is reected
in Zubiri’s notion that human history is at once part oi, and adds a
novum (something really new) to, reality itself,
What does human history add to reality? For Ellacuria, it adds
praxis, understood as a new level of reality (historical reality), History
evolves from, incorporates, and transforms (within limits) all of realv
ity’s other aspects (including the systemic and material properties of
matter, biological life, sentient life, and human life) it also adds the
content of history itselft In both cases, "l’raxis is identified with the his.
torical process itself, in as much as this process is productive and trans-
formative""" both of previous history and of nature.
lt is important to notice here that l? acuria’s treatment of history as
a systemic dimension of reality allows him to speak of a philosophy of
3‘ Xavier Zuhiri, lntlrligmtiu scntimtv: Intoligmria y militiad (Madrid: Alianxa
Editorial, 1980, Will, 1984) 10.
l“Gonzalez, "Aproximaciénf’ 982. The following paragraph follows Gonzalez
closely, See “Aproxirna 'on,“ 984
"Xavier Zuhiri, my!le dimimica the la malidmi (Madrid: Alianm Editorial,
WW),
“ llllacuria himself noth the signicance of this cimtrast in "lmrodmcion
critica a la antropologia filosol'ica dc Zubiri,” Realitas 2 ( l970) lit-137, esp, 754i,
5” Ellacuria, [ow/fa £18 In mzlx'dmi lllltlflul, 505,
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"historical reality” Indeed, he treats historical reality as a metaphysi—
cal category This background, then, helps us to understand that in the
1975 article Ellacuria is arguing from the premise that historicity be-
longs not only to the “essential structure of intelligence," but to the
essential structure of reality i elf (historical reality)! Accordingly Bl-
lacuria presents Aristotle’s classic distinction between the operations
of human knowng in thanria, pmxis, and fro ‘is, as representing “three
aspects" of how histi’irical reality and intelligence interact in the his-
toricity of human knowing This implies that, whether theology is
operating in the mode of interpretive thrim‘ia, ethical praxis, or techni—
cally constructive pnicsis, it must pay attention to the interaction of his.
torical reality and intelligence in its work. Returning to our example,
this means that the sacred sciences should function as ways of know-
ing, taking responsibility for, and transforming the historical reality of
the crucified people,
Methodologically, this leads Ellacuria to push theology: to free it-
self from the distortions which are created by historical patterns of
seeking "recognition by academic , , , lorl revolutionary elites”?3U to
develop methods which can ground truly Christian concepts like the
people of God and revelation in the historical reality of Latin America;
to develop proper relationships between its interpretive practices and
the type of socio~historical commitments called for in the Gospel; and
to make use of secular discourses from philosophy and the social sci—
ences in order to better ground the work of theology in historical real-
ity, while simultaneously being sure to guard against disfiguring “the
purity and plenitude of the fait ” when using these secular discourses.
Christian Historical Realism and Satcriolugy
Ellacuria’s 1975 article provides a synops' of the implications for
theological method which he drew from the philosophical formaliza-
tion of his Christian historical realism. Almost a decade later, Ellacuria
further elaborated a formalized concept of Christian historical realism
in an important l984 article, “The Historicity of Christian Salvation.”
The article asks, “What do human efforts toward historical, even socio-
political liberation have to do with the esteiblislunent of the Kingdom
of God that Jesus preached?”°‘ it proceeds under the assumption that
"the problem is primarily a problem of praxis. It is the problem of
Christians who, compelled by their faith and as an objective realization
of that faith, so k to make human action correspond as much as pos-
sible to God’s will [or the kingdom of God].”
no‘l’liilacuria, “l lacia una fundamental "
'
42
”‘ Ignacio lrillacuria/'l’listoricity oi Christian Salvation," Mystwiimi Liberalioms,
253.
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Ellacuria then makes a crucial move, explaining, that he will treat
revelation and history as correlative realities. in fact, the article will
assume that there are not two histories, a history of God and one of hu-
manity; a sacred and a profane history. Rather there is a single historical
reality in which both God and human beings intervene, so that God’s
intervention does not occur without some form of human participation,
and human intervention does not occur without God's presence in some
form.”
Ellacuria argues that this assumption requires a “historic d” treat.
ment of the concept of transcendence. Such an treatment rejects "per—
nicious philosophical influences” which have identified transcendence
with “separateness,” and taught that "historical transcendence is sepa-
rate from history." He argues that these philosophies are united by
their interpretation that “the transcendent must be outside or beyond
what is immediately apprehended as real” For them, the transcendent
is always "other, different, , . , separated , . . in time, . . , 5p *e, or
. , essence”3 from the historical object. instead, Ellacuria argues tor
a notion of transcendence as “something that transcends in lhistoryl
and not as something that transcends away from; as something that
physically impels to more, but not by taking out of; as something that
pushes forward, but at the sa me time retains."
The Value of this approach for a theological understanding, of sal-
vation history is that “when one reaches (30d historically . . . one does
not abandon the human, does not abandon real history, but rather
deepens one’s roots, making more present and effective what was
already effectively present.” Here we see the deeply Christian impli»
cations of Ellacuria's premise that neither intelligence (in this case, the
idea of transcendence) nor historical reality (which includes the actual
transcendence of God in history) can be placed above the other,
Ellacun’a then draws a startling insight from this argument: "God
can be separated from history, but history cannot be separated from
God, Sin does not make God disappear, but rather crucifies God/l“
The idea here is that, no matter how much one might deny the idea of
God, the saving presence of God continues to permeate historical real»
ity. of course, the radical denial of the historical reality of God will
have real implications: crucifixion, But here the solidarity of Jesus and
the martyrsmwhich accepts crucifixion as the price 0! love and solidao
ity, and has the resurrection as its completion and validation—vbecome
“lbid.
“lbid,, 254,
"“ lbid,, 255i
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tangible historical signs of transcendence and hope. Accordingly,
Ellacuria refu. cosmic dualisms as the final explanation for the in.
humanity of sin, as ing, "it may be possible to divide history into a
history of sin and grace; but the division presupposes the real unity of
history.” What this means, of course, is that we bear responsibility for
our actions. And, more positively, we have a crucial role to play in his-
toric ing the kingdom of God. Thus, it is Ellacuria’s profound Chris-
tian historical realism and his commitment to the unifying role of grace
in history which lead him to assert that it is historical reality itsle
(which includes the reality of the kingdom as well as the anti-kingdom)
which places a radical claim on the Christian disciple to take the cru—
cified people down from the cross.
CHRISTIAN lrllsil‘olx‘li‘m Ri Al,
AND '11 2' KiNt.i><.iM 0F (Lion
M, (,Tiiociriiao Prom ii,
l-Iisloricizaliou
it is in the context of this profoundly Christian "historical realism”
that Ellacuria develops his key concept of "histori zation.” In what
follows 1 will briefly suggest why I believe that igmcio Ellacuria’s key
concept of "histi’iricimtion" (which also Shapes; the work of Jon So~
brino) is quite parallel to the pragmatic maxim of C. S. Peirce.
My reading, of tillticuria finds two primary uses of the term in his
work. First, in the Philosimllyof Hieiurica/ Reality, Ellacuria uses the
term historicizat’ion to refer to the incorporative and transformative
power which human praxis exerts over the historical and natural di-
men.‘ons of reality. ()n the one, hand, "The historicization of nature
concurs . . . in the tact that humanity makes history from nature and
with nature/“5 On the other, praxis appropriates from historical tradi~
lion its concepts, values, pmcticeu, and other ways of being in reality,
simultaneously being shaped by and transforming them. In its pri‘
mary sense, then, historicimtion refers to this process. However, in a
1976 article entitled “The Historic ration of the Concept of Property as
a Principle of Deideologizatiou,” lillacuriai suggests that in a secondary
sense, “Demonstrating the impact of certain concepts within a par
ticular context is {also} . i . understood here as their historicization.”"“
[t is th econdary sense of the term (having to do with verifying the
truth claims proceeding from the first meaning of the historicization of
“f’l-llliicurin, les will dc Ia milimid losldrim, lot).
“""ln histor' in in del conccpto de ptopledad como principio do desidcolo—
gimcion,” £55m. _ (,‘mlnumwr‘lrmws 31 (1976) 42‘ 0 Translation from "The H' ‘v
tori tion of the Concept of Property,” 'liitmnls’ 47 $01 that Serve: Its: People:My
intellectual Contribution of! lllllltlllf/S Mimli'ml lest/lilo, e ., . john liasaett and Hugh
Lacey (Washington, DC: (iuorgetown tlnivemty Prose, will} 1W.
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a concept) which predominates in the great majority of his occasional
pieces, and on which we will focus here.”
Ellacuria makes several important claims in this piece whi i I
would summarize under the following three the-es. First, historicii, A
tion is grounded in historical realism. indeed, concepts are historici .ed
"when they refer to historical realit 53")" Ellacuria notes that this in the
opposite of being abstract (in the negative SenSe).‘iecond, historicized
concepts are subject to validity tests. Using, a , c notion of counter~
factual proof, Ellacuri’a argues that if a “hypotht
‘
cannot be invali—
dated by data, it is not” historicized. Indeed, he suggests that, in this
case, “one is falling into sheer idealism, no matter how much the real-
ist or the materialist one might claim to be." ’l’hird, historicization is a
procedure for testing and validating truth claims ‘sociated with a
concept Illacuria holds that the truth of a historicmed concept lies in
its “becoming reality,” such that its "truth can he meaeured in {its} re-
sults/“ti He then
-'rts that it is neces try to c<,>ntinuallyrevieae the
content of a given concept in light of its hintorical effects, in order to
maintain the “essential meaning" of that concept. Thus meaning is do.
termincd, at least in part, in terms of the practical effects»; of a concept.
One of Ellacuria’s ’tSl articles, published posthumo ly in 1990,
otters a summary of how he developed this approach to lustoricization
as a procedure for testing and validating truth claims during the last
fourteen years of his life.‘W Ellacuria begins by arguing that “it is in-
dispensable to submit the concept of human rights to a ‘hi‘a‘toriciza—
tioni’" He also expresses the hope that "thin “higtoricization/ will
illumine the theory and . . . empower the pmxis of human rights," as
Salvadorans try to decide “what to do with the ‘Common’ good in a so
ciety which is not only divided but conflicted” both by war and "the
unjust distribution of goods.”“"
"" It was to this latter project that Ellticuria, the public intellectual, dedicated
most of his career, Indeed he produced three massive volunicw containing, hun-
dreds of such articles, posthumously published and appropriately entitled Winter
mire de li‘mriu en el Salvador 1969 1959 (San Salvador: UCA "ditores, 1W1} Anto-
nio Gonzélei, his student who edited l‘iz't' oft}:dz: [a retilidml _ drim, suggesta that
for tillacuria, in the “histor ation of concepts like property, human rights or the
common good . , i the d ’6 thing for understanding their hiatorici itlon . . _
consists ,
. that their treatment in it ‘torical, that is, that it betting; from the
fact that they are linked to an historical praxw."
“3 Ellacun’a, ”lt,a historizt ion del concepto,” 427,
“‘
lbid., 42K
m’lguacio Ellacuri‘a, "l’listorimcion de los derechos hummios desdv lm pilot,»
los opn’midm; y las mayorias populares,” {studio Mirror;meriomm 302 (1990) R8977
96.
"5“ lbid., 589.
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The article then explains that the historicization of the concept of
human rights involves: the verification in praxis of whether the truth
claims, justice claims, and legal claims associated with specific human
rights are realized or not; the clarification of whether the right in ques-
tion serves the majority or just a few; the identification of the histori-
cal structures necessary to make the right in question historically
eifcctive; the cle-idcologization of theoretical discussions which mis~
represent historical reality, or which legitimize distortions like oppres-
sion and slavery; and the prudential quantification of what constitutes
an acceptable time table and degree for the realization of the rights in
qwxstim‘i,m2
While this article deserves its own extended treatment, for our
purposes it suffices to note how it shows that, at the time of his death,
Ellacuria had continued to develop the elements of historicization
which appear in the article from the mid 19705;. Indeed, I would sug—
gest that it shows that Ellacuria continued to understand historiciza»
tion (at least in part) as a methodological procedure (a) grounded in
historical realism, (b) subject to a wide range of validity testing, and (c)
fundamentally designed to test truth claims, Additionally, it emblem-
izcs the continued development of his keen interest in the real power
of this procedure for determining the true meaning of a concept in an
ideologically contested environment,
Pragmatism
It is hard to miss the profound parallels between Ellacuria’s procto—
dure of historicizau‘on and the pragmatic method of C. S, Peirce, I will
briefly comment on these parallels in order to adapt my own approv
priotion of Ellacuria's Christian historical realism to the semiotic di~
mensions of the task at hand: that of explaining the startling claim that
the crucified children of El Mozote are the symbol par excellence of the
historical reality of the kingdom of God,
These comments will be guided by the insight that Peirce regarded
pragmatism (just as Ellacun’a regarded historicization) as a methodo~
logical procedure "which is guided by constantly holding in view . i ,
the purpose of the ideas it analyzes/“l3 in what follows, I will briey
trace some significant parallels between l’eirce's pragmatic method
and Ellacuria/s method of historicization (the secondary sense of the
term outlined above) in regards to the three factors identified above,
“7” lbid, 590,
mCharles S. Peirce, Cilllt’Chld Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 5, ed, Charles
llartshornc and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) para
graph 5.13, no. l.
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GROUNDED IN A FORM or REA! lSM
Both Ellacuria and Peirce distinguish reality from truth, while
grounding truth in reality Peirce defines reality as "that mode of beingby virtue of which the real thing is as it is, irrespectively of what anymind or any definite collection of minds may represent it to bef’l‘“
Truth, on the other hand, is “the correspondence of a representation
with its object?”5 The point is that truth for Peirce, which has to do
with the relationship of an idea to its object, is ultimately knowledgeabout reality, which always maintains a degree of independence,“Ellacuria also grounds his notion of truth in what he understands
by reality. In the Philosophyof Historical Reality Ellacuria asserts that
“historical reality' is the ‘ultimate object’ of philosophy understood as
an intramundane metaphys’ s not only because of its globalizing and
totalizing character, but as the supreme manifestation of reality,"“"7Thus reality always maintains a degree of primacy and autonomy, AndEllacurin/s philosophical understanding of truth demands a corre
spondence between the concept (or intelligence) and historical reality(though it is more than that),
Like Ellacuria, Peirce believes that a key question is determiningwhat exactly “this correspondence or reference” of thought "to its ob-ject, consissl in,” Peircc’s answer to this question leads him to a semi-
otic realism which is at once quite distinct, and yet complementary toEllacuria’s historical realism For Peirce, all thought has the character
of a sign which is used to "stand for an object independent of itself,"WIt stands for that object, however, to somebody (or something) inwhom it arouses a second more developed sign, That more developed
sign then functions as an
"interpretant" for the meaning of the original
thought or sign.W Peirce describes this relationship in terms of the tri-
adic interaction between a sign, its object, and an intorprctant:
A Sign, or repri’smtzimm, is something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. it addrcsics somebody, that is,
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a moredeveloped sign. That sign which it creator; 1 call the interprcmni of thefirst sign, The sign stands for something, its chiral“
it” lbid,, 9,566.
“’Slbid, 5553f.
“‘3 For an elegant explanation of this relationship we john l~ iith, I’m-poseandThought: The Mnming of I’mgnmtism (New Haven, Conn; Yale University Press,197 'l,
acuria, Filmmfi’adc la walliin hisidrica, 42.
‘eirce, Collected Papers, 1,538,
c co [arm-N K. Feihloman, A72 lnlrmlui’li'm to My Philosophy of (fliarlvs ta, Prints(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1969, W70) 89.
‘iilllcirce, Coileca‘cd Papas, 2228‘
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W A,have Seen that for tillacuria "the formal structure of intelligence
. . not the understanding, of being or the grasp meaning, but i . .
apprehending reality and confronting oneself with that reality."‘” This
also involves a triadic relationship which l would suggest can he conv
side,er in some ways as analogous to (though significantly different
from) that described by Peirce. The first two elements of Ellacuria's
scheme—Agening to know reality and taking, responsibility for doing
bomething about that reulity-»~parallel his Steps of apprehending and
confronting; oneself with reality. He, also adds a third element, actually
translorming n. it)?“ This is based on the assumption that praxis, in«
cluding; its signifying and conceptualizing aspects, in actually “identi~
tied with the historical process ‘eh‘X’l‘3
Working analogically with this material, we might say that Ellacu‘
ria’s activities oi" getting to know, taking responoibility for, and trans-
forming reality could be understood to function as signs or symbolic
actions which “stand . i . to somebody for something," and "create in
the V , V [historical reality] of that person [or persons] an equivalent
Sign, or perhaps a more developed sign” (understood a new praxis),
The idea here is. that when a new Pl’aXlSi5 elicited as a response to an
original praxis of getting to know and taking responsibility {or histori-
cal reality, some transformation in historical reality is produced This
response, could he, Lind ood analogically as the interpretanti We see
this reflected in
'
‘um 9 etforts lo historicize concepts like democ-
racy and human rights in order to clarify their real meaning and to test
truth i‘laims associated with them by political leadersv
SUB or R) VAlll,ll‘lY Tl I‘Nt;
Peirce, like llllacuriii, is also interested in the question of validity
testing, For Peirce, the question of validity is determined by logic,
which he understands as “the science oi the general necessaiy laws of
signs,“H Peirce regards logic as simply "another name for semiotic
.
, the quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs"”" which governs
“the theory of right reasoning,” determining “what reasoning ought to
lac/“m Validity is not only a formal question for Peirce, however, His re‘
alism leads him to also treat logic as “the science of i . , true represen-
tation"”’ Peirce then develops his pragmatic method as the solution to
lacuriu, I‘ilosoa dc In realm'ud lzisltirica, 419- 20,
lhid.
“‘lbidi, R98,
“‘Peii‘ce, Collected Papers, Hill ; 2%.
“mid, 2227‘
“Whirl, 2.7
“’lhidi, 131W,
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the problem of verifying truth Claims regarding the correspondence of
a thought or sign with its object. Thus we see that, for Peirce, the pray,-
matic method is “a Maxim of [logic/“‘0‘ a "logical rule,“W a “logical
doctrine,” and a
"theory of logical analysis, or true definition,“20
which grows out of his study of the formal laws of sign relation. But it
is much more than that, for it carries him into the question of the ver'
ification of truth claims
In this I find a more developed parallel to Ellacuriu’o notion that
historicized concepts are subject to validity testa. And we have seen
that it is grounded in the distinction between truth and reality, exem-
plified in lillacuria’s admonition that stubborn allegiance to a "hypo,thesis [which] cannot be invalidated by data" shows that "one is
falling into sheer idealism, no matter how much the i‘eiiliut or the ma‘
terialist i
, , [they] might claim to be” Most significant for our pur-
poses, however, is that fact that the validity qu on cannot be treated
apart from the role of historicizalion in extahlis 1mg the relationship oftruth to reality and the verilication of truth claims.
DESK ‘ED FUR rm? ViiRlllit‘e‘i't’liWN D}? 'l Ru’i‘ii (Xi
Peirce a pragmatic method is degigned to over the meaning of
a concept and to test its truth (mime; The essence of his formulation of
the pragmatic method it: best captured in his first formulation of the
pragmatic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivablyhave practical bearing, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then our conception of these efiec is the whole of our conception of
the object/'1“ Peirce is working here with the triadic relationeliip be-
tween the Sign (our conception), its objoct (that which the Sign or con-
ception refers to), and its interpretant (the eyflrctswe conceive the object
of our conception to have). One way that Peirce explains the basic
point is his idea that the meaning of a sign or concept may be said to
"consist in how it might cause , i i {anyone or anything apprehendingthe Sign] to act/“3’ These actions or effects then serve as the interpre»
tant of the real meaning of the original Sign or concept. Our conception
of them is considered to be equivalent to our understanding of the
meaning of the original Sign or concept,
But what if the real actions or effects we observe are different than
those we originally predicted deductiver from our conception? Peirce
believes that clear and rational thought about something will formu-
“lhidv Sill
Ibid,, 5465.
' lbid, 6,490.
‘1' lhid 5.2V
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late a hypothesis about the object, then use the hypothesis to predict
the object's tutui actions under Certain circumstances The pragmatic
maxim, then, is designed to help us to determine the truth of the afore-
mentioned hypothesis (or idea) by creating a C(mzpmismibctwcm the pre—
dicted and the?zctm’il(eas (or between the hypothetical meaning and
the actual meaning) of the Sign or concept,m Ono must then judge
whether the effects 7'Ve evidence that the laws postulated in the origi-
nal hypothesis do, in fact, govern the reality of the object,
This is analogous to the way tillacuria’s notion of historicizution
works in providing a principle of verification for the truth claims of a
given concept First, Ellacuria believes that the way a concept repre-
sents historical n-valityto specific persons or groups can serve several
purposes (ideological, truthful, legitimating, liberating, etcl lfind this
to be an excellent example of what Peirce means by a sign. Second,
Ellacuria's notion that historicimtion is “demonstrating the impact of
certain concepts within a particular context" is parallel to l’eirce's idea
that in the pragmatic maxim that the interpretant of the meaning of a
sign could be said to “consist in how it might cause , . . [anyone or
anything apprehending the Sign] to act/’1“ Third, as l have already
suggested, his triadic notion that the role of the concept in entering,
taking responsibility tor, and transforming historical reality is some-
what analogous to Pei e’s idea that a Sign refers to an object for a sub-ject in which it arous ,, mother more developed sign, its intrrpretzmt
As in any analogy, there are significant differences between the
work of those philosophers as well, though I do not have time to ex-
plore them here. Rather, my purpose is to briey exploit the parallels
in their work in order to develop a hypothe s which treats the cruci‘
tied people in the work 0t 15 icuria and Sobrino as the interpretant of
the historlcimtion of the kingdom of (incl. However, it is worth adding
that 1 would hope that the convergence-s lat-tween two of the, most im—
portant philosophers of Latin and North America would contribute to
the framework of future NorthSouth dialogues in the Americas
The CrurricdPetich Al’? the Sign of the
Hisliiricizntimi (2fIlia Kingdom ufGod
I will rely on what 1 have just written to legitimate the following
adaptation of Ellacuria’s Christian historical realism to the semiotic cli-
mensions of an important task, In what follows I will conclude by try-
ing to historicize for Us, theology and ethics the startling claim that
the crucified children of lil Momte are the symbol par excellence of the
historical reality of the kingdom of God,
"’ bid., 5.82592.
'1‘ livid, 5.135.
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Jon $obrino has argued that "liberation theology , , , claims to
have found in the Kingdom of God a totality from which it can deal
with all theological subjects, . . . ranklingl them in accordance with
their closeness to the ultimate mystery, now formulated as lthel King-
dom of Codf’m Interpreting this semiotically, I would say that Sobrino
is arguing that the kingdom of God functions as the preeminent sign of
salvation on the continent, Elsewhere, Sobrino writes that, “in the last
analysis, what liberation theology says is that the Reign of God is to be
built in history i . i and that, in the light of faith, we see ourselves to
be on the road, as we accomplish this partial construction, to the de.
finitive Reign of God,"”" Here, following Peirce and Ellacuria, I would
argue that this amounts to saying that the objectof the reign of (indis
historical reality. This implies, then, that the goal of Christian(1 'ctplev
ship is the realization (or historicixation) of the reign of God in histori-
cal reality, lf these assertions are true, then one is forced to ask the: truth
question in reference to reality: Does the concept of the reign of God
preached by Jesus and the church actually correspond to historical re'
ality as we have it?
‘
This question, which has challenged the faith of ,lesus’ followers in
various forms since his crucifixion, must be confrontedi For those of us
here I ask, what is the meaning of this reign of God, initiatud by testis,
in light of the helpless screams for mercy of the innocent children of El
Mozote? Our hearts are broken again when, reminded by Church
teaching and the example of the saints, we realize they are our chil'
dren, and we are their parents. We are horrified by the historical real-
ity that our taxes and our bullets make us their executioners, even as
they cry to us for mercy
The logic of the images we have explored in this essay leads us to
the conclusion that the crucified peoples themselves must finally in—
terpret the meaning of the kingdom of God for us, But this is too much
for us! How can the meaning of the reign be revealed by the intentional
crucifixion of so many Children? Here we turn again to the words of
Ignacio Ellacuria: “God can be separated from history, but history can-
not be separated from God. Sin does not make God disappear[from
history], but rather crucifies God’”” in history, This startling mSight
‘5 Sobrino, lesus the Liberator, 289, n. 3L
1
I“‘ZlonSobrino, “Central Position of the Reign of (Bud in Liberation Theology,’
Mysterium Liberationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology,ed, Ignacio
lacuria and and Jon Sabrina (Mary/knoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993) 377, Publishedin
Spanish as “Centralidad del reino de Dios en la toologia de la vliberi‘acion,"Mys—
teriimz Liberationis; Conceptos Fumlammtalr’s de la lleologm dc la Liberation (Madrid:
Editorial Tmtta, 1990) 2:386,
"7 lbicl” 255.
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brings us up against the reality that it is our sin (at least in part) which
brought about the crucixion of the innocents of El Mozote. Can we
deny this? What salvation is there in such a terrible conclusion?
We were warned that openng our hearts to the cries for mercy of
the crucified people as God’s offer of salvation would turn out to he
"as scandalous as accepting God’s; choice of the Servant, and the em.
cified Christ” to bring salvation/‘3“ But let us ask again, what salvo»
tion do they bring?
Sobrino suggested that they struggle tenaciously against all odds
to feed, clothe, and nurture their children in a world structured to
guarantee their starvation. Some find in them a stumbling block, others
a call to conversion. They suffer for the sinful excess of our obsessions
with “national security," a growing GNP, international monetary policy,
and counterinsurgency doctrine, Yet they are a “light to the nations”
unmasking “the lie by which this world’s reality is concealed/‘2" re~
venting that "the United States has i . . a bad solution, both for it and
for the world in [gm-literal”OThey embody the possibilities of a para-
doxical "civilization of poverty” which serves as perhaps the only real
alternative to the current "civilization of capital, in all its capitalist and
socialist forms,"m We recall that this odd utopia involves "all sharing
austerely in the earth’s resources so that they can stretch to every-
body.” And, finally, they cling to "values that are not offered e se-
where.”m Though Sobrino accepts the possibility that, in some ca es,
it may be “because they have nothing else to hang on to,"m he sa ‘ the
salvic importance of truly humanizing values should not be trivial-
ized or discounted,
Is this salvation? Do our hearts bum within as we walk together on
the road of our common history? Do we recognize him in the breaking
of our bread with the starving? Or in the euchurist of solidarity evoked
by their suffering? Can we ground this kind of faith in theological rea‘
sons? in the end, Sobrino says that while "it is necessary for us to
speak of i , . crucified peoples," he believes that "the sole object of all
this talk must he to bring7them down from the cross "m Finally, the
historical reality oi the interconnectedness of our sins id their stiffen
ing should be enough to establish the claim of the crucified peoples on
theology and ethics in the United States. However, our apprehension
5’” Ibid, 260,
l2"l‘bid, 261i
W E lCllrltl, “Quinto Centennr
ihrino, Imus the Lilimitor, 2(32
ibrino, Jesus the ! ilmmmr, 261i,
‘lbid., 263,
“will, 4*),
2781, Cited in Sohrino, [PSI/18thy Liberator, 2o1.
brino, “Crucified Peoples,” 54.
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of and selfAconlrontation with their historical reality offers the, possi‘
bility of formulating a positive and lomial theological principle re-
garding the operation of grace and salvation in our world today: the
efcacious impact on our hearts and minds of the hopes and dreams of
the children of Fl Mozote, as well as the tragedy of their deaths, is the
ultimate interpretant of the truth and meaning of the kingdom of God
in our national reality today In a world still in the grip of sin, where
children are murdered with US, weaponry in the name of democracy,
our embrace of the hopes and dreams of our crucified neighbors will
be an exemplary historicmation of grace and salvation
